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Abstract
Electronic voting machines have complex requirements. These machines should be developed following best
practice with regards to the engineering of critical systems. The correctness and security of these systems
is critical because an insecure system could be open to attack, potentially leading to an election returning
an incorrect result or an election not being able to return any result. In the worst case scenario an incorrect
result is returned — perhaps due to malicious intent — and this is not detected. We demonstrate that
an incorrect interface is a major security threat and show the use of the formal method B in guaranteeing
simple safety properties of the voting interface of a voting machine implementing a common variation of the
single transferable vote (STV) election process. The interface properties we examine are concerned with
the collection of only valid votes. Using the B-method, we apply an incremental reﬁnement approach to
verifying a sequence of designs of the interface for the collection and storage of votes, which we prove to be
correct with respect to the simple requirement that only valid votes can be collected.
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1 Introduction
The problem of electronic vote counting (or tabulation) involves a wide range of is-
sues, requiring expertise in science, engineering and technology. As such, it provides
a good challenge for the application of formal methods.
1.1 E-voting: background and motivation
Applying state-of-the-art computer and information technology to “modernise” the
voting process has the potential to make improvements over the existing paper (or
mechanical) systems; but it also introduces new concerns with respect to secrecy,
accuracy and security [10]. The debate over the advantages and disadvantages of
e-voting is not a new one; and recent use of such systems in actual elections has led
to their analysis from a number of viewpoints: usability [11], trustworthiness and
safety criticality [14], and risks and threats [17].
Despite ungoing uncertainty over the trustworthiness of these systems — which
is the major disadvantage associated with them — many countries have chosen to
adopt e-voting.
In a recent paper, Kocher and Schneier [12] conclude by stating: “The threats
are real, making openness and veriﬁability critical to election security.” The formal
methods community is experienced in chasing technological change in software engi-
neering: and this paper proposes that, in general, already existing formal techniques
can help to alleviate many 5 of the veriﬁcation problems that the adoption of new
e-voting technologies can introduce. For the speciﬁc modelling and veriﬁcation in
our study we chose to use the B method.
1.2 The B Method
B is a method [1] for specifying, designing and coding software systems. The concept
of reﬁnement [5] is the key notion for developing B models of (software) systems in
an incremental way. B models are accompanied by mathematical proofs that justify
them. We start from an abstract model and each subsequent model is a reﬁnement
of the previous one. Proofs of properties of B models help to convince the user
(designer or speciﬁer) that the (software) system is correct, since they demonstrate
that the behavior of the last, and most concrete, system (software) respects the
behaviour of the ﬁrst, most abstract model (which we assume has already been
validated).
1.3 E-voting: formal methods, correctness and security
We propose to construct a formal, mathematical model of the e-voting problem in
B. We argue that no e-voting system can be considered “safe” until the require-
ments of these systems are better deﬁned and introduce reﬁnement as a method for
5 We do not expect that all of the problems can be addressed completely by the use of formal methods.
For example, problems of human error and those posed by malicious intent are very diﬀerent in nature, but
can both arise from simple design ﬂaws. Our focus is on veriﬁcation of design steps.
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supporting the correct design and implementation of “safe e-voting systems”. In
this paper we concentrate on the front-end of the e-voting system (the user interface
for the voters).
Our view is that the collection and tabulation must be developed formally:
human error in the development of the collection and tabulation software might
have considerably more serious consequences than such errors in the manual system.
We argue that even a minor design ﬂaw in the way in which votes are collected and
passed on for tabulation can lead to security weaknesses that could be exploited by
an election saboteur.
2 Critical system development: formality and security
To motivate the use of formal methods, we argue that e-voting is at least mission
critical and may, in some circumstances, be considered as safety critical [14]. For
our argument we consider a “worst case scenario”, where the system fails to elect the
correct candidates without the failure being identiﬁed. There is no meaningful way
of equating this with a ﬁnancial cost but its potential negative impact on the well-
being of individuals and society is great. Thus, we must consider e-voting systems
to be (at least) mission critical and we advocate the use of formal methods in their
development as their application should ensure that the likelihood of failures due
to modelling errors during design is reduced.
From a technological viewpoint we know that system (and interface) design
has an important role in security assurance. Mercuri [15] addresses the theme of
quality in the process of engineering security: “By encouraging artistry and applying
craftsmanship to our security problems, viable solutions will emerge. One way of
starting this process is by deﬁning computer security with respect to need.” This
supports our view that one must start with a simple model of the security needs
and reﬁne that model, during design, towards a correct implementation. For this
reason we chose a simple security requirement — that only valid votes can be found
in the system — and start our formal development from there.
3 Valid Votes: a STV case study
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) model on which we build this case study is
regarded as a good democratic election process. However, it incorporates a complex,
not necessarily determinisitic, tabulation (counting) procedure. In 2003, Farrell and
McAllister [8] reported on how a subtle change in the implementation of the STV
rules can lead to major changes in the results returned.
In this paper, the counting algorithm is not developed formally. However, a
brief overview of the tabulation process will help us to develop our claim that it is
critical that there is a formal veriﬁcation of the property that only valid votes are
counted.
D. Cansell et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 183 (2007) 39–55 41
3.1 Overview of the typical counting algorithm
During an election, a candidate is elected if the number of votes they have is greater
or equal to the quota. This quota, Q say, is a function of: the number of valid votes,
V say, and the number of seats available for election, S say. It is usually deﬁned by
the equation: Q = 1 + V
S+1 .
We note that the quota cannot be calculated without knowing the number of
valid votes, and so its correct calculation is dependent on the notion of validity
being correctly implemented. This notion is non-trivial as the STV election process
allows voters to register support for more than one single candidate, by placing
candidates in a preferred order. Thus on each vote, a candidate may or may not
have an associated preference.
Informally, a vote is considered valid if and only if it shows a unique ﬁrst pref-
erence. The means of specifying this property depends, of course, on a notation for
representing a vote. Consider a constituency where there are three candidates: A,
B and C, say. We could choose to represent a vote as a string of characters taken
from the alphabet {A,B,C}. In such a string, we naturally interpret a character
ch at index i in the vote string as stating that the ith preference of that particular
vote is the candidate ch. Now, we can deﬁne a valid vote in this constituency by
explicitly identifying the set of valid vote strings, for example:
{A,B,C,AB,AC,BA,BC,CA,CB,ABC,ACB,BAC,BCA,CAB,CBA}.
In such a deﬁnition we preclude, for example, the following strings from being
considered as representations of valid votes:
• The empty string — correctly excluded, we would argue, as there is no ﬁrst
preference.
• The string AA — excluded, perhaps, because the candidate with the ﬁrst prefer-
ence has another associated preference. (We note that this was not explicit in the
original informal deﬁnition, and it would be normal for this interpretation to be
validated through additional discussion of this requirement with the customer.)
• The string ABBC — excluded, perhaps, because the number of preferences can-
not be more than the number of candidates. (We note, again, that this was not
explicit in the original informal deﬁnition.)
Of course, it is better 6 to deﬁne the notion of validity as a generic boolean
function that takes any string of characters and decides on its validity, without
having to explicitly construct all the members of the valid vote set. An even better
approach, as taken with our abstract B model is to specify the set of all valid votes
and to use reﬁnement to be sure that a vote belongs to this set without having to
actually construct it (as it exists in the abstraction).
6 Simple, naive, construction (listing) of the complete valid vote set is infeasible for elections involving even
a moderate number of candidates.
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3.2 Requirements for valid votes
Within any voting system, changing the deﬁnition of a valid vote can have major
consequences for the election process and the results returned. In any STV system,
for example, there is a major diﬀerence between allowing and requiring a voter to
place all candidates in a preference order.
In our model, it is required that a vote is considered valid if and only if it shows
a unique ﬁrst preference. This is a simple requirement, but one which can cause
problems if it is not treated formally.
Clearly, if invalid votes manage to get passed to the tabulation process (to be
counted) then there is a risk that this could break the counting process. For example,
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that some of the tabulation methods make
the assumption that the votes being counted are valid. However, without some
degree of formal veriﬁcation it is also likely that an invalid vote could — by accident
— be counted and that this could lead to an incorrect result, a run-time error, or
non-termination. Consequently, this weakness could also be exploited by an attacker
to deliberately manipulate the election process.
Such a potential attack is similar to those mentioned in [16] where the security
of votes stored in memory is addressed. In particular, the use of Trojan code to
exploit vote data that has been tampered with is shown to be a real threat that
requires elaborate schemes for the secure storage of votes. In most e-voting systems,
there is a clear interface between the storage of votes and the input of votes. We
argued that the same degree of care must be taken in designing the vote interface
to ensure that Trojan code cannot be used to exploit the input of invalid votes.
3.3 Validating votes in a typical implementation architecture
Typically, a voting machine has a simple, classic, layered architecture. We pro-
pose a generic, abstract model 7 in order to illustrate the need for formality in the
processing of votes electronically:
• An interface facilitates the voter to input their preferences.
• A store records the preferences of all votes that have been input.
• A tabulator takes all the votes from the store and calculates the result.
We argue that an invalid vote in the tabulation process can compromise the
security of the whole election. Thus, for an e-voting system to be considered secure,
it is necessary that the tabulator does not process invalid votes; and so the store
cannot transfer invalid votes into the tabulator. Consequently, it may be necessary
to show that the store cannot receive invalid votes from the interface. There are
clearly a number of design decisions that need to be taken with respect to the im-
plementation of this simple architecture; and it is the responsibility of the designers
to verify that their designs are correct with respect to the validity requirement.
7 We deliberately choose not to model a speciﬁc machine.
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4 Informal software design for vote validity
In this section we comment on typical design decisions that arise during implemen-
tation of our generic architecture. We focus, for simplicity, on the ﬁrst layer of our
architecture: the interface. Simple analysis of the requirement for only valid votes
in the tabulation process could lead one to designing a machine where the interface
layer takes responsibility for guaranteeing that voters record only valid votes and
rely on a secure store. In all the following designs we refer to buttons that the user
can press and the information that is displayed to the voter. We abstract away from
details of how these buttons and displays are implemented.
4.1 The rapid prototyping approach
We wish to verify that a given interface design implements the requirement that no
invalid vote can be sent to the store. A standard technique for carrying out such a
veriﬁcation is to incrementally add rigour to the process, structuring the veriﬁcation
process in a number of layers.
A typical 3-layer approach, which we used for the purpose of our study, is:
• Run some voting scenarios through the natural language description and check,
by hand, that there are no obvious examples of a scenario that leads to the
requirement not being met.
• Prototype an executable model of the design and test this executable model as
thoroughly as possible.
• Formalise the prototype model so that more formal model-checking or theorem-
proving can be used to show that the design is correct.
In practice, with simple designs such as a simple vote interface, developers often
see no need to progress to layer 3. In the designs that follow in the remainder of
this section, we follow a rapid-prototyping approach that never progresses to the
3rd layer of rigour. In Section 5 we show how the B method and tools can be used
to fully support layer 3 in this veriﬁcation process.
In this section we concentrate on the validity of a single vote. We note that the
validity of a complete set of votes will require that each individual vote is valid. The
validity of individual votes will be a necessary, but perhaps not suﬃcient condition
for the validity of all votes.
Before we consider verifying the property that the system contains only valid
votes, it is necessary to formulate what we mean by a valid vote in a way that
the design veriﬁcation process can be automated. This means that, in our chosen
modelling language, we have to choose a means of specifying the property that needs
to be checked.
Consider the Java code 8 which models the Vote (of a single voter) as an array
of “Candidates”.
8 Starting with simple Java models helps us to identify the main issues with respect to interface evolution
and reﬁnement.
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public class Vote{
int numberofCandidates;
int preferences [];
// Vote - construct empty Vote with no preferences
public Vote(int numCs){
numberofCandidates = numCs;
preferences = new int [numberofCandidates];
for (int i = 0; i<numberofCandidates; i++) preferences[i] = 0;
}//END Vote Constructor
// ...
}// END CLASS Vote
We now formally specify a safety 9 property that deﬁnes a valid vote as a
boolean method of the Vote class.
// isValid *****************************************************
// The safety property to ensure the validity of a Vote
// A vote is valid iff there is a unique 1st preference recorded
public boolean isValid(){
int numberof1s =0;
for (int i = 0; i<numberofCandidates; i++)
if (preferences[i]==1) numberof1s++;
return (numberof1s==1);
}// END Vote.isValid
Of course, this invariant property could be modelled using design-by-contract
[6] language and tool support. However, in this initial case study we choose to use
only fundamental concepts that are part of the core programming language: we
believe that little, if any, current voting software incorporates more rigorous design
by contract methods.
Given the formal (constructive) speciﬁcation of a valid vote (in Java) we can now
proceed to the design of the ﬁrst component of our generic architecture: the inter-
face. The goal is to oﬀer alternative interface designs and to verify the correctness,
or otherwise, of each.
4.2 Design1: the simplest interface
We propose the following design for veriﬁcation:
“Every candidate is associated with a candidate button. Beside each candidate
button, information is displayed to show the preference that is associated with
that candidate. Initially, at the beginning of each vote, no preferences are dis-
played. When a voter presses a candidate button (for the 1st time) then it is
assumed that the voter selected that candidate to be their ﬁrst preference, and
the number 1 is displayed beside that candidate’s button. When a voter presses
(for the second time) another candidate button then this is taken to represent
their second preference, etc. . . . If they press a candidate’s button that already
has a preference associated with it then that press is ignored. When a voter is
happy that they have recorded all their preferences, they press a validate vote
9 The use of the word ‘safety’ here does not mean that the property is “safety critical” in the classic sense
that lives may be at risk, for example. The term is taken from the formal methods community where it
is used to refer to an invariant property of the system that must be true all the time otherwise system
behaviour cannot guaranteed to be correct. It may be a safety property of the system but that does not
necessarily make the system safety critical.
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button and the vote is sent to be stored. The validate vote button will only send
the vote if at least one candidate button has been pressed.”
We now model the design by a Java method (pressCandButton) which imple-
ments the behaviour of the system in response to the pressing of a candidate’s
button. We note that the choice of underlying data representation, with a vote as
an array of candidate’s preferences, maps closely the structure of the voting data
as presented to the voter.
// Design1
// pressCandButton *******************************************
// Record next press as a preference, provided button is enabled
// Calls lastPref() to correctly assign the next preference value
// Calls buttonEnabled() to check if preference already allocated
public void pressCandButton(int button){
if (!buttonEnabled(button-1)) return;
else preferences[button-1] =lastPref()+1;
} // END Vote.pressCandButton
This pressCandButton method is dependent on two other methods:
buttonEnabled for checking if the button being pressed is actually enabled (has
not been pressed before), and lastPref for ﬁnding out the value of the last prefer-
ence selected. The buttonEnabled behaviour is straightforward to implement, and
left as an exercise for the reader. The lastPref method, as implemented below,
examines all the preferences and deduces that the largest current preference value
must have been the last preference made. We note, for future reference, that this
is a correct (but ineﬃcient) implementation of the design.
// lastPref ******************************************************
// Called by pressCandButton()
protected int lastPref(){
int largest =0;
for (int i = 0; i<numberofCandidates; i++)
if (preferences[i]> largest) largest = preferences[i];
return largest;
} //END Vote.lastPref
It is not easy to ensure the correctness of even this simple interface design
without explicitly specifying and correctly implementing the isValid() method, as
we have done. Without an explicit stament of what is valid, it is possible that the
notion of validity could be interpreted ambiguously and thus the engineers could
believe that they have built a correct interface when such an interface allows votes
to be cast that the users do not consider to be valid.
4.3 Poor design may lead to security risks
A reasonable approach to rapidly prototyping this “simple” ﬁrst design is to realise
that a vote is valid as soon as one of the candidate buttons is pressed. This was
hinted at in the initial statement of the design:
“The validate vote button will only send the vote if at least one candidate button
has been pressed.”
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It is a much quicker and simpler solution to hardcode this as an enabled boolean
variable. In fact, this solution is correct but it is a poor design because it is not
robust to changes in requirements. Consider a scenario where the interface require-
ments are extended to allow voters to reset their vote (in order, perhaps, to facilitate
them in correcting an input error, or in changing their minds). The design using
boolean enabled could result in the developers forgetting (during the coding of the
new design feature) that they need to set this value to false when a vote is reset,
and consequently lead to their designs allowing an empty vote — with no preferences
recorded — to be sent to the store. Could this sort of thing happen in a real e-voting
system? Judging by analysis regarding the quality of the code (and development
methods) used in systems that have been examined in detail [13], one could not be
sure that professional developers would not make the same simple mistake.
It is diﬃcult to judge the severity of such an interface design fault. Clearly, it has
the potential for voters to have their voting intentions incorrectly recorded. This
could lead to an election returning the wrong result. A second risk is that invalid
empty votes in the store may break the tabulation process: if tabulation methods
(functions) work on the assumption that all votes have at least one unique ﬁrst
preference (and may have been tested under that assumption) then it is possible
that tabulation may not even terminate if this assumption is broken. A third risk
is that some attacker has managed to introduce code into the system that can
manipulate the tabulation process but will only be called when an invalid vote (or
password-like sequence of invalid votes) is passed to the store. Of course, rigorous
design procedures should ﬁnd these types of design ﬂaws without the need to resort
to formal methods. However, in critical system design, “should” is not good enough.
4.4 Design2: a more sophisticated, incorrect, interface design
In the second design, we analyse how an extension to the requirements, in order
to provide a more sophisticated interface, can pose speciﬁc problems. Imagine that
we wish to provide a means of a voter changing their vote, without them having to
reset all their preferences. In particular, we wish them to be able to cancel the last
preference chosen (in the case that they accidentally pressed the wrong button).
We propose the following design for veriﬁciation:
“if the voter presses a candidate button again then that preference is erased”.
This is a faulty design, but without the use of formal methods are we sure to identify
the fault before more costly implementation takes place?
The VoteExt1 class uses the inheritance mechanism in Java to add this extra
interface feature to the already existing Vote class.
In an ideal world, our development tool(s) should be able to automatically tell
us that, either: the new functionality respects the safety property of the exisiting
Vote class (that we have already formally veriﬁed) and provide the proof, or identify
at least one scenario in which the new functionality breaks the safety property.
This code nearly works: it implements the requirements correctly provided one
makes the assumption that a voter will only press a button a second time (to cancel
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// Design2
public class VoteExt1 extends Vote {
VoteExt1 (int numCs){ super(numCs);}
// pressCandButton ***********************************************
// The new feature requires over-riding of pressCandButton().
// Here is how it SHOULD NOT be done
public void pressCandButton(int button){
if (!buttonEnabled(button-1)) preferences[button-1] = 0;
else preferences[button-1] =lastPref()+1;
} // END VoteExt1.pressCandButton
} // END VoteExt1
a preference) immediately after pressing that button for a ﬁrst time, with no other
preferences being recorded in the mean time. We model this using B in Section 5;
and demonstrate how the B tools automatically prove that the system is “broken”
if this assumption about the voter’s behaviour is invalid.
4.5 The risk of feature interactions in design
We note that making parallel changes to requirements and design models can lead
to feature interactions similar to those well documented for telephone services [9].
Consider the interaction between two features that by themselves do not break
the safety property of the system but when combined lead to invalid votes being
recorded:
• The lastPrefs method was optimized by adding a counter value so that an
iteration through the candidate list was not required each time a new preference
was input.
• A reset button was added to allow all preferences to be deleted.
Individually, each of these reﬁnements does not compromise the system by allowing
the introduction of previously invalid votes. However, together they can result in an
invalid vote with no ﬁrst preference being recorded even though some preferences
have been selected. (With candidates A, B and C, for example, the sequence of
button presses A-B-reset-C leads, under the new combined feature functionality,
to an invalid vote where only the 3rd preference for C is recorded.)
4.6 Design3: a more sophisticated, correct interface design
Consider the interface design whereby a voter can press a candidate button a second
time and this will delete that candidate’s preference value, as in Design2, above.
However, it will also delete all the preference values lower than the preference just
deleted.
Informally, one can verify its correctness with the following reasoning: “This will
guarantee that if the 1st preference is deleted then all the preferences are deleted
and that the empty vote is the only invalid vote that can be found in the interface.”
We see, in the next section, how we prove the correctness of the design in a more
formal manner.
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// Design3
public class VoteExt2 extends Vote {
VoteExt2 (int numCs){ super(numCs);}
// The extension over-rides the pressCandButton method.
// pressCandButton *********************************************
public void pressCandButton(int button){
if (!buttonEnabled(button-1)) {
int deletefrom = preferences[button-1];
for (int i = 0; i<numberofCandidates; i++){
if (preferences[i] >= deletefrom) preferences[i] = 0;
else preferences[button-1] =lastPref()+1;}
} // END VoteExt2.pressCandButton
} // END VoteExt2
Name Syntax Deﬁnition
Binary Relation s ↔ t P(s× t)
Domain dom(r) {a |a ∈ s ∧ ∃b.(b ∈ t ∧ a → b ∈ r)}
Codomain ran (r) dom(r−1)
Restriction s r id(s); r
Co-restriction r  t r; id(s)
Anti-co-restriction r − t r  (ran(r) − t)
Image r[w] ran (w  r)
Partial Function s → t {r | r ∈ s ↔ t ∧ (r−1; r) ⊆id(t)}
Total Function s → t {f | f ∈ s → t ∧ dom(f) = s}
Total injection s t {f | f ∈ s → t ∧ f−1 ∈ t → s}
Fig. 1. B set notations
5 Formal software design for vote validity
5.1 Incremental development and reﬁnement
The main idea in our reﬁnement based-approach is to start with a very abstract
model of the system under development. We then gradually add details to this ﬁrst
model by building a sequence of more concrete ones. The relationship between two
successive models in this sequence is that of reﬁnement [5,1]. This is controlled
by means of a number of proof obligations, which guarantee the correctness of the
development. Such proof obligations are proved by automatic (and interactive)
proof procedures supported by a proof engine [7]. The essence of the reﬁnement
relationship is that it preserves system properties.
Figure 1 gives set-theoretical notations of the B data modelling language. A
complete introduction to B can be found in [1].
The reﬁnement of an event B model [2,4] allows one to enrich the model in a
step-by-step manner. Reﬁnement provides a way to construct stronger invariants
and also to add details to a model. It is also used to transform an abstract model
into a more concrete version by modifying the state description. This is essentially
done by extending the list of state variables (possibly suppressing some of them), by
reﬁning each abstract event into a corresponding concrete version, and by adding
new events. The abstract state variables, x, and the concrete ones, y, are linked
together by means of a gluing invariant J(x, y). A number of proof obligations
ensure that: (1) each abstract event is correctly reﬁned by its corresponding concrete
version, (2) each new event reﬁnes skip, (3) no new event takes control for ever,
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model
AllV otesAtOnce
sets
ELECTOR;CAND
constants
nbc
properties
nbc = card(CAND)
definitions
valid(v) b= ∃n · (n ∈ 1..nbc ∧ v−1 ∈ 1..nCAND))
variables
vote, nbv
invariant
vote ∈ ELECTOR↔ (CAND × (1..nbc)) ∧
∀e · (e ∈ dom(vote) ⇒ valid(vote[{e}]) ∧
nbv ∈ N ∧
nbv = card(dom(vote))
initialisation
vote := ∅||nbv := 0
events
Voting b=
begin
vote, nbv : |
0
BBB@
vote ∈ ELECTOR↔ (CAND × (1..nbc)) ∧
∀e · (e ∈ dom(vote) ⇒ valid(vote[{e}])) ∧
nbv ∈ N ∧
nbv = card(dom(vote))
1
CCCA
end
and (4) relative deadlock-freeness is preserved.
Following the traditional reﬁnement process, the ﬁrst model (AllVotesAtOnce)
we propose is very high level: it abstracts away from individual votes and button
presses. There is only one event — Voting — which models the votes of all electors
who came to vote in one shot.
For readers unfamiliar with the B modelling language, we note that:
• ELECTOR is the set of all electors and CAND is the set of all candidates,
• vote is the variable which contains votes of all the electors, and
• nbv is the cardinal of the domain of vote representing the total number of votes.
Instead of modelling all the votes in a single one shot, as above, in our next step
we choose to reﬁne the most abstract speciﬁcation so that each individual vote is
modelled, using the event One Vote in the model EachVoteAtOnce. Without such
a reﬁnement a realisitic implementation cannot be constructed.
In this more concrete EachVoteAtOnce model, STATE is an enumeration set
which contains two values: voting to represent a voting system that is open, and
finish to represent when the voting is closed. The variable st contains one of these
values, elector is the subset of ELECTOR recording the electors who have already
voted, vt is the variable which contains these votes, and cvt is its cardinal. All votes
in vt are valid. The event One Vote models the vote of a single elector in one shot
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model
EachV oteAtOnce
refines
AllV otesAtOnce
set
STATE = {voting, finish}
variables
vote, nbv,
st, elector, vt, cvt
invariant
elector ⊆ ELECTOR ∧
vt ∈ elector ↔ (CAND × (1..nbc)) ∧
dom(vt) = elector ∧
∀e · (e ∈ dom(vt) ⇒ valid(vt[{e}]) ∧
cvt ∈ N ∧
cvt = card(elector) ∧
st ∈ STATE ∧
(st = finish ⇒ dom(vote) = elector)
initialisation
vote := ∅ || nbv := 0 ||
st := voting || elector := ∅ ||
cvt := 0 || vt := ∅
events
One Vote b=
any e, v, n where
st = voting
e ∈ ELECTOR− elector
n ∈ 1..nbc
v ∈ 1..nCAND
then
vt := vt ∪ ({e} × v−1) ||
elector := elector ∪ {e} ||
cvt := cvt + 1
end ;
Voting b=
when
st = voting
then
vote, nbv := vt, cvt ||
st := finish
end
end
(as a single event).
The B models that follow correspond to the three Java designs that we saw in
Section 4. We show how the designs can be formally veriﬁed when modelled in B.
5.2 Design1: the simplest interface
In this Vote model — which corresponds to the Java Vote class — an elector e
(who has not already voted) votes for candidates by pressing on the corresponding
buttons.
One voting is an enumeration set which contains three values: no elec when no
electors are voting, start when the a new elector e starts to vote, and valid when the
elector e pushes the button to validate their vote. The variable sto contains one of
these values. Variable e contains the current elector, vt is their current vote which
is modiﬁed when a candidate button is pushed, and n is the preference number of
the chosen candidate.
We remark that the guard of the event Button valid requires that n = 0 and so
we are sure that when an elector pushes this button then the partial vote v is not
empty and so v is a valid vote. Remark also that we have no condition on n in the
guard of the event Button cand. When a candidate is not in the codomain of v we
are sure 10 that n < nbc.
10We have proven it thanks to the invariant property and the reﬁnement construct. This proof, as all others
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model
V ote
refines
EachV oteAtOnce
set
One V oting = {start, valid, no elec}
variables
vote, nbv,
st, elector, vt, cvt
e, n, v, sto
invariant
e ∈ ELECTOR ∧
v ∈ N↔ CAND ∧
n ∈ 0..nbc ∧
n = card(ran(v)) ∧
sto ∈ One V oting ∧
(sto = no elec ⇒
v ∈ 1..nCAND) ∧
(sto = no elec ⇒
e ∈ ELECTOR− elector) ∧
(st = voting ∧ sto = valid ⇒ n = 0)
initialisation
vote := ∅ || nbv := 0 ||
st := voting || elector := ∅ ||
cvt := 0 || vt := ∅ ||
sto := no elec || e :∈ ELECTOR ||
v := ∅ || n := 0
events
Start vote b=
any E where
sto = no elec ∧
E ∈ ELECTOR− elector
then
sto := start ||
e := E ||
n := 0 ||
v := ∅
end ;
Button cand b=
any c where
sto = start ∧
c ∈ CAND − ran(v)
then
n := n + 1 ||
v := v ∪ {n + 1 → c}
end ;
Button valid b=
when
sto = start ∧
n = 0
then
sto := valid
end ;
One Vote b=
when
st = voting ∧
sto = valid
then
vt := vt ∪ ({e} × v−1) ||
elector := elector ∪ {e} ||
cvt := cvt + 1 ||
sto := no elec
end ;
end
5.3 Enriching the interface: Design2 and Design3
In the previous model an elector cannot correct input mistakes: now we specify
three: (1) delete that candidate’s preference (corresponding to VoteExt1 in the
Java), or (2) delete that candidate’s preference only if that was the last preference
made (corresponding to the suggested “ﬁx” that we wished to formally verify), or
(3) delete that candidate’s preference and all lower preferences (corresponding to
VoteExt2).
In the ﬁrst design, if we remove the corresponding vote and decrement our
counter an unproved proof obligation is generated. This is formally treated by the
Button cancel incorrect cand event. In particular, the new event doesn’t preserve
referred to in the paper, is available from the authors on request.
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Button cancel incorrect cand b=
any c where
sto = start ∧
c ∈ ran(v)
then
n := n− 1 ||
v := v − {c}
end ;
Button cancel last cand b=
any c where
sto = start ∧
n → c ∈ v
then
n := n− 1 ||
v := v − {c}
end ;
Button cancel cand b=
any c where
sto = start ∧
c ∈ ran(v)
then
n := v−1(c)− 1 ||
v := {n|n ∈ N ∧ n < v−1(c)}  v
end ;
(sto = no elec ⇒ v−1(c) − 1 = card(ran({n|n ∈ N ∧ n < v−1(c)}  v))
the invariant which says that the partial vote v is an injection.
In Section 4, we suggested a “ﬁx” to the previous design. Using B, this “ﬁx”
can be formally modelled (in event Button cancel last cand) and proven correct.
In fact, there are no diﬃculties to prove the invariant preservation. All new proof
obligation are discharged automatically by the prover.
For this event there was only one diﬃculty in the proof process: we need to prove
that v−1(c) − 1 = card(ran({n|n ∈ N ∧ n < v−1(c)}  v)). We have proved this
assertion — for all c in the co-domain of v — by simple induction on the assertions
clauses.
6 The semi-automated proof process
The complexity of the development is evaluated through the number of proof obli-
gations generated for the validation of each model or reﬁnement; among generated
proof obligations, a large number are automatically discharged by the tool [7]. In
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our simple case study, 44 proof obligations are automatically discharged, and 10 are
interactively proved using the tool but with human help.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated the use of the formal method B in guaranteeing a simple
safety property of an interface to an e-voting machine. We demonstrated that
guaranteeing validity of votes recorded not only helps in the formal veriﬁcation of
the voting process, but also has an important role to play in making the machine
more secure. This is the ﬁrst step in developing a generic framework for the design of
secure interfaces which could be proved to satsify various safety-related properties.
It is our goal to try and formulate such a framework as a set of formal design
patterns much like those proposed by Abrial when using B to verify properties of
control systems [3]
There are interesting alternative techniques for e-voting, like pollsterless systems
[18] which could beneﬁt from further formal veriﬁcation using our approach. This
is planned for future work. Furthermore, we are currently using B to prove the
correctness of an actual storage mechanism which claims to oﬀer tamper-evident,
history-independent and subliminal free data structures [16]. After this we aim to
use B to prove safety properties concerned with the tabulation of votes, and so
verify all layers in a typical voting architecture.
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